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The Russian Federation has the most cases pending before the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg. Recent studies on the rule of law in Russia indicate that Russians are 
vigorously litigating before domestic courts and national human rights institutions, de-
spite low levels of trust in the judicial system. Yet, is claim making inside the country the 
cause of the burgeoning caseload pending before the Court? This review essay evaluates 
the different types of judgments and claims coming from Russia and maps out recent lit-
erature on the various types of litigation with the European Court of Human Rights. In 
particular, it puts forward a research agenda for studying the actors behind litigation and 
the types of cases they bring to the Court. Furthermore, the essay proposes how we might 
analyze some of these complaints before the ECtHR from a sociolegal perspective.
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After the Cold War, the Council of Europe (CoE)—Europe’s main international human 
rights institution—had to cope with the integration of former socialist Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. To handle the growing flow of applications from these recently 
overturned legal systems, the CoE set up a new European Court of Human Rights 
(hereafter, ECtHR or “the Court”) in 1998, granting citizens the right to lodge indi-
vidual complaints before the Court under Protocol No. 11 (Madsen 2007:155). The 
Court’s establishment created a regional forum where claimants could confront their 
state after failing to receive a remedy before domestic courts, alleging that their 
state has violated their rights as guaranteed under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (henceforth “the Convention”). The ECtHR is responsible for provoking 
thousands of policy changes in the 47 member states of the CoE (Stone Sweet and 
Keller 2008), but it has also become a popular instrument whereby citizens seek re-



















Russian complaints with the ECtHR in particular evoke two general observa-
tions. First, some legal cultures are more litigious than others (Greer 2013). Among 
the Council of Europe’s member states, Russia holds top place in the list of coun-
tries with pending applications. A second often-repeated observation is that the 
Russian government only partially implements the Court’s rulings. For instance, 
the CoE’s Committee of Ministers (CoM) often criticizes the Russian state for carry-
ing out investigations of violations ineffectively at the domestic level. Especially 
in judgments concerning the second violent conflict in the Chechen Republic, the 
Court’s judgments have only slowly been implemented beyond the payment of fi-
nancial compensation (Committee of Ministers 2007; Issaeva, Sergeeva, and Such-
kova 2011; Lapitskaya 2011). Courtney Hillebrecht (2012) terms this selective 
practice as “à la carte compliance”; some Russian lawyers classify it as a “tax on 
impunity” (Van der Vet 2013). Despite numerous applications from Russians, hopes 
of receiving a favorable judgment from the ECtHR appear unjustified, given that 
most complaints (more than 98 percent) never result in a favorable decision. High 
inadmissibility rates are common among member states and are not exclusively 
related to Russia. Moreover, a typical Russian application takes four to seven years 
to process at the Court. These rather bleak prospects of receiving a judgment—
often following a prolonged legal process at home—does not appear to prevent 
Russian litigants from pursuing justice at the ECtHR. 
I examine this problem by first reviewing the recent literature on Russian liti-
gation before the Court and by defining the various types of cases lodged by Rus-
sians.1 Second, I analyze some of Russia’s responses to the Court’s rulings. In a 
third section, I branch out to argue that to fully understand the effects of interna-
tional litigation we need to analyze the intentions and strategies of the actors 
behind litigation instead of solely depending on legal analyses of the products of 
litigation, the ECtHR’s case law. I conclude by suggesting that the study of inter-
national human rights litigation would benefit from engagement with social scien-
tific literature on the dynamics of human rights practice (Merry 2006) and with 
studies on cause lawyering (McCann 2006; Sarat and Scheingold 2005).
The eCthR in The Russian FedeRaTion:  
ThRee Types oF JudgmenTs
Previous research suggests that Russians view the Court as a powerful site for the 
pursuit of justice that has failed at home (Trochev 2009). Certainly, the Court has a 
strong symbolic value in that it may counter any domestic court’s decision or provide 
financial compensation to the individual applicant. Laura Henry (2012) stresses this 
as part of a larger social trend: Russians, in general, favor making legal claims before 
courts over participation in political party activities, as litigation appears nonpoliti-
cal. Little doubt exists over the litigiousness of Russian citizens in Strasbourg: by 
1 Parts of this review essay are based on the introduction to the author’s doctoral dissertation 
“Finding Justice at the European Court of Human Rights: The Dynamics of Strategic Litigation and 
Human Rights Defense in the Russian Federation,” University of Helsinki, 2014.
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December 2013, 16.8 percent (16,813 out of 99,900) of the total complaints pending 
before the ECtHR are applications against the Russian Federation (European Court of 
Human Rights 2014). However, looking at the number of applications per capita, with 
0.86 applications per 10,000 citizens, Russia naturally scores lower in comparison 
with several southeast European countries, for instance Romania (11). The Russian 
caseload consists of, broadly, three types of cases: repeat cases, high-profile cases, 
and strategic litigation cases.
First, most of the cases coming from Russia are considered repeat applications 
(Leach 2007). Besides the litigiousness of Russian citizens, two internal challenges 
within the Court account for this surge of repeat applications: first, the way the 
Court has failed to make a narrower selection of applications in the past, and sec-
ond, most cases coming from the 47 member states are so-called clone cases (Leach 
2009:727). Clone cases are applications that concern issues on which the Court 
previously made decisions, and they come from most member countries, not just 
from Russia (Leach 2007). Because of their repetitive character, they may have 
limited impact on the scope of the Convention. Sperling (2009:269) argues that 
because no adequate legal reforms have been made to prevent the repetition of 
certain violations, clone cases will continue to come in from Russia. 
Second, besides clone cases, Russia has been faced with high-profile claims 
that fetch widespread media attention. Such cases include the various claims of 
infamous oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskii, who complained before the Court 
about his right to a fair trial during the many corruption proceedings against 
him. In his first complaint, Khodorkovskii and his lawyers claimed that the trial 
against him and his 14-year prison sentence were politically motivated and 
would, therefore, violate Article 18 of the Convention. The democratic political 
opposition and members of civil society in particular deemed the trial against 
Khodorkovskii to be politically motivated and campaigned for many years for his 
release. In their view, he was imprisoned as a result of his involvement in fi-
nancing democratic political parties, such as Soiuz Pravykh Sil (Union of Right-
ist Forces) and the Democratic Party Yabloko (White 2006). However, the ECtHR 
disagreed: besides finding several violations in the lengthy court proceedings 
and access to legal representation, the Court ruled that there was no political 
motivation behind the first trial, as there was sufficient evidence against 
Khodorkovskii to bring him to trial.2
A third group of applications originates from the work of litigation projects. 
These cases are primarily lodged by a group of three NGOs and less so by individual 
applicants (Mayer 2011). NGO litigation differs from individual claim making for 
three reasons. First, these organizations often represent a larger group of claimants 
that have suffered the same systemic violations (Hodson 2011). Second, NGOs that 
repeatedly lodge claims have the opportunity to tinker with the broader societal 
impacts that litigation might have (Galanter 1974). Third, they are often involved in 
2 Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, App. No. 5829/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104983.
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transnational networks of legal specialists, which enhances their capacity to bring 
large numbers of cases before the Court (Van der Vet 2012).
Beginning in the early 2000s, several Russian human rights NGOs have included 
litigation projects in their campaigns, employing lawyers who litigate on behalf of 
victims of grave atrocities. For example, the human rights society Memorial began 
collaborating with the London-based European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, giv-
ing legal aid to victims of the second conflict in the Chechen Republic (1999–2009). 
Earlier studies predicted that the increasing number of Chechen applications would 
be a challenge to the Court (Goldhaber 2007). But, while these cases have not lost 
their urgency, cases from Chechnya are not the sole reason for the strenuous relation 
between the Court and the Russian Federation.3 The overall majority of the cases 
won by these NGOs between 2005 and 2014 concern the complaints of relatives of 
people who disappeared after unacknowledged detention. Through their interna-
tional litigation on such cases, these NGOs were able to expand the scope of the 
European Convention, especially by determining under which circumstances a dis-
appearance can be considered a violation of the right to life (Article 2) (Barrett 
2009; Van der Vet 2012). Another branch of NGOs, such as the Yekaterinburg-based 
organization Sutiazhnik,4 aims to expand the knowledge of Russian judges on the 
European Convention and the citation of ECtHR case law in domestic judgments 
(Burkov 2007; McIntosh Sundstrom 2012:258). Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom reports 
that “an important additional pressure on judges was provided by a 2003 resolution 
of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Russia that clearly instructed judges on their 
obligations to know and apply ECtHR case law to their own cases” (2012:258). Ini-
tially, due to a lack of a Russian language translation of ECtHR judgments in the 
Court’s HUDOC database, domestic judges had limited opportunities to familiarize 
themselves with the Court’s case law (McIntosh Sundstrom 2012). In April 2014, the 
Court partly removed this obstacle by launching a Russian version of HUDOC, with a 
growing number of translations (RAPSI 2014).
The Russian government has various responses to these judgments. Some judg-
ments provoke more national criticism than others, especially when the Court criti-
cizes the conduct of higher national courts, such as the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation.
Russia Responds To The CouRT
The ECtHR is a powerful international court that acts as a platform for resolving do-
mestic struggles and individual complaints against the state. Its judgments are, 
however, also a source of increasing nuisance for the various CoE member states, in-
cluding Russia and the UK. The ECtHR is certainly a powerful instrument for con-
fronting the state for relatively weak actors such as NGOs.
3 Arguably, despite the tragic violations in Chechen applications that demand international 
attention and remedy, they have become, for the Court, repetitive. 
4 Sutiazhnik means someone who likes to sue in order to obtain something, to achieve benefits 
for themselves.
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Especially since the conflict in Ukraine, the CoE has hardened its stance against 
the Russian Federation. On April 10, 2014, in an unusual act of opposition, the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) suspended the voting rights of the 
Russian Federation in an attempt to sanction the country for its annexation of 
Crimea. This suspension stipulates that Russia has lost its representation in the PACE 
and its ability to operate in election monitoring missions until January 26, 2015. The 
only other time that the PACE took such a position against Russia was when it sus-
pended the country’s application for membership to the CoE in 1996 due to military 
activities in the Chechen Republic. Pamela Jordan (2003), however, found that the 
CoE’s stance on the Chechen conflicts was rather disingenuous. It sent Russia mixed 
messages in 1999 after the country launched its antiterrorist operation in Chechnya, 
when it first suggested that Russia had the right to intervene in the Chechen Repub-
lic to protect Russian citizens but later criticized Russia’s course of action (Jordan 
2003:683). Jordan (2003:684) also argues that by sending a mission to Chechnya to 
monitor the human rights situation there the CoE decided to abandon taking more 
radical measures, such as expelling Russia from the Council. 
Overall, however, the ECtHR’s judgments have been a source of domestic criti-
cism against the interference of international institutions. This issue arises not only 
in Russia. The United Kingdom and Turkey are examples of other countries where 
politicians often see the Court as meddling in domestic affairs.5 These countries 
have often chosen to pay financial compensation but resisted further implementa-
tion, such as reopening domestic investigations, issuing apologies, or starting truth 
and reconciliation proceedings (Hillebrecht 2012). Some Russian officials have 
voiced their criticism of the Court in recent years. Especially following the case Kon-
stantin Markin v. Russia,6 a debate began concerning the ECtHR’s influence on Russia’s 
domestic affairs. In this case, Konstantin Markin, a radio intelligence operator in the 
Russian army who was divorced with three children, was denied parental leave by the 
Russian military on the grounds that such a leave can only be granted to female per-
sonnel. Eventually, Markin brought his case to the Constitutional Court of the Rus-
sian Federation, claiming that denial of parental leave is unconstitutional, violating 
the principle of equality between men and women. The Constitutional Court, in re-
sponse, rejected his application in 2009, arguing that by signing a military contract 
he had abandoned some of his civil liberties. After bringing his case to Strasbourg, 
the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled in Markin’s favor and argued that the denial of 
parental leave was a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Arti-
cle 8 (right to private and family life) of the Convention. The ECtHR’s ruling provoked 
a critique from Valerii Zor’kin, president of the Constitutional Court (Zor’kin 2010). In 
5 See for instance the dispute between the United Kingdom and the Court on the voting rights 
of prisoners in two recent cases (Hirst v. the United Kingdom [No.2], App. No. 74025/01, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. [2005], http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70442; Greens and 
M.T. v. the United Kingdom, App. Nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. [2010], http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-101853).
6 Konstantin Markin v. Russia, App. No. 30078/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109868.
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his written response, Zor’kin criticized the ECtHR for meddling into what he saw as 
domestic affairs. Soon thereafter, speaker of the Federation Council Aleksandr Tor-
shin proposed a bill that would limit the influence of the ECtHR on Russia’s jurisdic-
tion and Constitution (Russia Today 2011). 
The complaints before the Court are opportunities for individuals and NGOs to 
seek leverage in their domestic campaigns (Van der Vet 2014). The ECtHR has become 
a stage upon which the individual can confront the state. Viewing the Court in such 
way opens up several additional avenues for inquiry into complaint making. 
developing Two soCial-legal ReseaRCh agendas: 
impaCT and agenCy
This section proposes two research agendas that will go beyond legal studies of the 
Court’s case law: first, an analysis of the effects of litigants’ strategies on the claim-
making process; and second, an analysis of the social life and impact of the Court’s 
judgments. Social scientists and sociolegal researchers should claim space to exam-
ine the actors that operate behind claim making. They could analyze (a) how Rus-
sians perceive the ECtHR and their motivation to take their complaints to the inter-
national level and (b) how the ECtHR might have an impact on Russia’s legal culture 
and litigious consciousness. Such a perspective would enrich the literature on Rus-
sian law by examining how claim making in the Russian Federation reflects the devel-
opment of the rule of law (Hendley 2009; Henry 2012; Kurkchiyan 2009). 
analyzing The aCToRs behind liT igaTion
Analyses of the ECtHR have given insight into the creative nature of the Convention 
system (Mowbray 2005), the involvement of human rights experts in the reform of 
the Convention system (Madsen 2007), and its shifting stance vis-à-vis the Russian 
Federation (Bowring 2009; Leach 2007). Besides analyzing the fruits of litigation—
the judgments—I argue here that the actors behind litigation often put their stamp 
on the case. Arguably, all litigants have their own expectations about the impact of 
their complaints with the ECtHR, be it financial compensation or recognizing their 
claims of human rights violations. The ECtHR judgments are those cases that made it 
through the selection process of lawyers and the ECtHR and have failed to find re-
course before domestic courts. People can only apply to the Court when their com-
plaint is based on the European Convention, when they have exhausted all domestic 
remedies, and when they file an application no later than six months after a domestic 
higher court’s final judgment. NGOs and lawyers often handle applications with suf-
ficient evidence and that are illustrative of a systemic human rights problem (Van 
der Vet 2012). Individuals who receive a final judgment in their application belong to 
the 1–2 percent of applications that make it through the selection process and are, 
therefore already, a “privileged” group. 
A first group of applicants are those that “fail” to result in a final judgment. 
While most studies focus on the official decisions by the Chamber Court, Grigorii 
Dikov’s study (2009) analyzes the majority of cases that are rejected by the Commit-
tee of the Court. The Court disposed most of these applications during the admissi-
FREEK van dER vET. PRoTECTIng RIgHTS In STRaSbouRg: dEvELoPIng a RESEaRCH agEnda… 111
bility stage based on administrative errors. The author compares his own data with 
an official report published in 2008 by Center for Political Technologies (Tsentr polit-
icheskikh tekhnologii) in Moscow. Dikov found that only 3 of the 250 cases in his 
dataset were brought before the Court by lawyers and that the majority of these ap-
plications were filed by men who were either prisoners or connected to the Ministry 
of the Interior or the Ministry of Defense. Dikov (2009) furthermore explains why 
these applications fail: in the majority of these cases, applicants chose to appoint 
nonprofessional representatives, which ostensibly resulted in a low success rate for 
their applications; another reason may be that these claims do not concern viola-
tions of political and civil rights granted by the Convention. Within this category fall 
those cases that do result in a judgment but are clones of earlier cases on which the 
ECtHR already made a decision. Vladislav Starzhenetskii (2012) found that Russian 
judgments are often clones and cluster around several human rights issues. The first 
of these issues concerns the nonenforcement of judgments and excessive length of 
domestic legal proceedings (Article 6). A second group of complaints is related to 
the overcrowding of prison cells, denial of medical care to inmates, and insufficient 
sanitary facilities in penal institutions (Article 3). A third breach concerns issues 
surrounding the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention) 
(Starzhenetskii 2012).
A second group comprises successful citizen applications that became high-
profile cases and pilot judgments. The pilot-judgment procedure of the Court ad-
dresses repeat applications by requesting that the respondent state eliminate a 
structural problem.7 The first judgment against Russia, Burdov v. Russia,8 led to Bur-
dov v. Russia (No. 2),9 a pilot judgment. The ECtHR issues pilot-judgment procedures 
in cases that concern widely experienced violations. In these judgments, the Court 
stipulates in greater clarity which steps the respondent states should make in order 
to prevent future similar violations. Anatolii Burdov worked in the cleanup opera-
tions following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. Because he worked in an area with 
nuclear emissions, he was entitled to social benefits. In his first complaint to the 
ECtHR, he claimed that the Russian authorities had failed to pay those benefits on 
time. In the second complaint, the ECtHR took up the Burdov v. Russia case again to 
deal with a growing number of similar cases on the nonenforcement of domestic 
judgments concerning social benefits. It turned out that Burdov continued to assist 
other people with lodging similar complaints before the Court (Kovler 2012).
7 “The Pilot-Judgment Procedure,” information note issued by the Registrar of the European 
Court of Human Rights (2009) (http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Pilot_judgment_procedure_
ENG.pdf). In addition, except in pilot judgments, the ECtHR rarely formulates in clear terms which 
reforms the respondent state should make in order to prevent future violations. Some have argued 
for using the example of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, as this tribunal stipulates in 
greater detail how its judgments should be executed (Koroteev 2010; Sandoval 2012). 
8 Burdov v. Russia, App. No. 59498/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60449.
9 Burdov v. Russia (No. 2), App. No. 33509/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-90671. 
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A third group comprises applications lodged by NGOs and activist lawyers. The 
study of Russian litigation before the ECtHR would benefit from a closer look at the 
sociolegal literature on cause-lawyering or public interest litigation (Hershkoff 
2009; McCann 2006; Sarat and Scheingold 2006a). In particular, the strategic litiga-
tion of NGOs rests on an interpretation of law that acknowledges the gap between 
“law by the books” and “law on the ground” (Hershkoff, n.d.). They often lodge stra-
tegic cases in order to incite social change or alter law enforcement practices. Activ-
ists in general operate within a spectrum of interests and needs. They have to, first, 
negotiate their commitment to the needs of victims and human rights; second, meet 
the requirements of foreign funders that often have their own agenda; and third, 
perform their work in an often violent and politically restrictive context (Abu-Lug-
hod 2013:158–159). International lawyers operate within a similar field.
International litigation differs from domestic litigation for three reasons. First, 
in her study on NGO litigation before the Court, Loveday Hodson argues that much of 
our understanding of complaints with the ECtHR rests on a narrow assumption of the 
individualistic nature of complaining; we assume that most cases have been brought 
by individuals pursuing justice. According to her, this perspective is inadequate when 
studying NGOs (Hodson 2011). NGOs often represent a large number of applicants. 
Second, Hodson (2013:268) reveals that most successful claims made under Article 2 
(the right to life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture) of the Convention are brought 
by NGOs. The NGO claims from Russia seem to reflect this trend, as most of these 
complaints focus on violations of fundamental human rights (Mayer 2011; McIntosh 
Sundstrom 2012; Van der Vet 2012). Finally, as opposed to the individual applicant, 
an NGO often nurtures strategic goals for a collection of complaints (Cichowski 2011; 
Sarat and Scheingold 2006b). NGOs are often selective in the cases they represent 
(Bukovská 2008; Van der Vet 2014), and their litigation is strategic in the sense that 
it goes beyond seeking individual remedies for victims (Hershkoff 2009). Instead, 
their strategic litigation aims to mend law-enforcement practices, expand the scope 
of the European Convention, push for new legislation, or address systemic violations 
(Hershkoff, n.d.). 
The analysis of human rights complaints to the Court faces several difficulties. 
First, the study of human rights litigation can be rather delicate work, as it remains 
hidden from the public eye. Another difficulty is that the complaints are not readily 
available except directly from the applicant or their legal representative. However, 
analyzing the actors that inform the litigation process can give greater insight into 
the intended impact and strategic nature of international litigation.
Reassessing implemenTaTion: appliCanTs  
and soCial ConTexT
The burgeoning caseload before the Court raises questions about the future of the 
Court within Europe and its impact on the national level. Scholars have questioned 
whether the Court should provide remediation for individual victims or, rather, be-
come a European constitutional court that would be more selective in the cases it 
hears but ultimately have more power over governments to guarantee human rights 
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protection (Greer 2013; Greer and Wildhaber 2012; Wildhaber 2011). Steven Greer 
(2013) found that social scientists have not shown much interest in examining the 
Convention system. He states that “studies of the Council of Europe and the ECtHR 
remain overwhelmingly dominated by lawyers and jurists with their traditional con-
cern for normative and procedural issues and a disappointing lack of professional 
interest in the wider picture” (Greer 2013:150–151). He then proposes a sociolegal 
research agenda for studying the impact of the European Court of Human Rights 
through country-specific case studies.
Studying impact matters for understanding how governments cope with interna-
tional criticism about their human rights record. In her recent study Hillebrecht (2014) 
reframes the question “Why does Russia not implement the Court’s judgments?” to 
“Why does Russia implement judgments at all?” She gives two explanations for this “à 
la carte compliance” (Hillebrecht 2012): First, Russia is trying to deflect international 
criticism by partially implementing the judgments and paying financial compensation. 
Second, and more fascinatingly, Hillebrecht argues that by executing part of the ECtHR’s 
judgments Russia creates a platform on which it can criticize the conduct of the CoE 
and the ECtHR (Hillebrecht 2014). The practice of admitting that a human rights viola-
tion has taken place but simultaneously criticizing the legal categorization is a com-
mon counternarrative used by governments against critical human rights reports or 
the judgments of international courts: for example, “the event happened, but it was 
not genocide” (Cohen 1996). Accordingly, the judgments of the European Court are not 
only a criticism against Russia, but partial implementation can also become a platform 
for Russia to criticize the influence of international courts on its domestic policies. In 
this sense, the implementation of human rights is not a one-way linear process but an 
interaction (Saari 2009).
Impact can also go beyond the implementation of individual judgments or the 
mending of national legislation: the ECtHR’s judgments can work as leverage for do-
mestic campaigns by human rights organizations or impact processes of transitional 
justice—how societies cope in the aftermath of violent conflict through truth com-
missions or trials (Roht-Arriaza 2006). In the Chechen cases, other NGOs have picked 
up the ECtHR’s judgments to advocate for the prosecution of perpetrators and the 
establishment of an electronic database of violations (Van der Vet 2013). For local 
newspapers, the ECtHR provides an opportunity for resistance. Eleanor Bindman 
(2013) argues that while Russian discourse is predominantly critical towards the 
Court, some newspapers seize the Court’s Chechen judgments as grounds for writing 
critical articles on the government. The ECtHR’s judgments are, therefore, not an 
endpoint for the individual claimant, but a successful claim can grow into sustained 
claims from other actors (McIntosh Sundstrom 2012; Van der Vet 2013).
A second complication arises when we look at the litigation process from the per-
spective of the victim or applicant. The distance between the applicant and their legal 
representative can be greater as some of the litigation projects do not have their of-
fices in the same country as the victims (Bukovská 2008; Hodson 2011). Relatedly, the 
distance between the lived experience of the victim and the abstract machinery and 
language of an international court can be great. Human rights practitioners who “stand 
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in the middle” have an important part to play in the translation of human rights from 
the institutional level to the community level (Merry 2006). As to the social context of 
the applicant, conflicts can arise between the intentions of the legal representative 
and those of the victim and his family (Bukovská 2008). In his study on relatives of the 
disappeared in Nepal, Simon Robins (2011, 2012) found that while legal councilors of-
ten have dominant normative ideas about providing legal remedy to the individual, the 
impact of a disappearance confronts the family of the disappeared and his community 
in ways that exceed individual damages. Their communities might not perceive the 
disappearance as a violation of human rights but believe a person’s disappearance to 
be connected to his collaboration with terrorists; this belief can have a significant 
impact on how the rest of the community treats the family of the disappeared (Robins 
2011). Indeed, these societal consequences of human rights violations are difficult to 
measure and possibly even harder to remedy.
The problem of distance raises vital questions in the study of complaint making: 
who is actually making the complaint and influencing its outcome? How can we as-
sess how these judgments affect the lives of an individual applicant or the commu-
nity they live in (Bukovská 2008)? Besides the legal representatives, other actors 
may have a say in the selection of cases. Foreign funders often influence, for better 
or worse, the human rights issues an NGO works with (McIntosh Sundstrom 2006). 
During the early 2000s a number of scholars assessed the impact of foreign funders 
on the building of civil society and democracy in Russia (Hemment 2004; Henderson 
2003; McIntosh Sundstrom 2006). Particularly, McIntosh Sundstrom (2006) pointed 
out that the values of these funders are often mismatched with the realities and 
needs of NGOs on the local level. Despite the fact that in the current political climate 
it has become increasingly controversial to mention foreign funding for Russia’s NGO 
sector, litigation projects are still partially dependent on international support (Van 
der Vet 2014). In these circumstances, assessing impact can become complicated.
ConClusion
This essay reviewed recent literature on human rights litigation before the ECtHR. In 
particular, it argued that to understand the effects of international litigation we 
need to analyze the intentions and strategies of the actors behind litigation. There 
are two reasons why: First, this will give us insight into the intended strategies of 
these actors on the impact of human rights litigation at the local level. Second, it will 
provide insights into the unintended consequences of human rights litigation and to 
what extent this type of human rights protection can provide remedies for the indi-
vidual applicant and his or her community. As the ECtHR is concerned with its own 
power, impact, and wider future role in Europe, we might consider reflecting on the 
societal impact of its rulings, beyond the legal impact. As the violations heard by the 
Court are often systemic, studying how victims and their communities give meaning 
to their complaints with the Court becomes ever more significant.
The study of human rights litigation has further significance for the study of 
Russia and Eastern Europe. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, East Euro-
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pean states turned to the Council of Europe and ratified the European Convention on 
Human Rights in rapid succession. Most of these states, however, did not suspect at 
the time that the European Court would take a progressive role in guaranteeing hu-
man rights in its member states. With the rising caseload and the creation of the 
ECtHR, the Convention became a highly specialized legal practice and European hu-
man rights law became a profession (Madsen 2007). Thus, the integration of East 
European states and Russia into the Convention system developed parallel to the 
development of European human rights law as a whole. Consequently, studying the 
practice and implementation of international claim making in Russia also gives us a 
broader understanding of how litigation has developed as a professional practice in 
Europe as a whole.
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Большинство исков, рассматриваемых Европейским судом по правам человека 
в Страсбурге, поданы из Российской Федерации. Как показывают недавние исследо-
вания правопорядка в России, недоверие к судопроизводственной системе не мешает 
россиянам активно судиться как на местах, так и в общегосударственных инстанциях 
по правам человека. Однако можно ли утверждать, что рост числа исков в Европейс-
кий суд обусловлен спецификой российской судебной практики? В этом обзоре дается 
оценка разных типов вердиктов по российским искам и обсуждаются новые работы 
по различным типам судебных процессов в Европейском суде по правам человека. 
В частности, автор формулирует текущие задачи по изучению основных субъектов су-
дебного разбирательства и типов дел, представляемых ими на рассмотрение Страс-
бургского суда. Помимо этого, в обзоре предлагаются способы анализа некоторых 
таких ходатайств в Европейский суд с социально-правовой точки зрения.
Ключевые слова: Европейский суд по правам человека; Европейская конвенция 
о правах человека; судебный иск в интересах неопределенного круга лиц; главенство 
права; правоприменение; Российская Федерация
